Microeconomics
Syllabus of Advanced Microeconomics II
Course Introduction
Spring Semester, 2011
Instructor: Zhiyong Tu, assistant professor of economics.
Address: Building C Room 410, email: zytu@szpku.edu.cn
Course Introduction
This course is a continuation of Advanced Microeconomics I. It will cover part of the general equilibrium theory and the game theory as a whole. It will also briefly introduce the behavioral models. In the game theory section, we will introduce solution concepts for various games and their classical applications. In the general equilibrium section, we will present the theoretical framework for general equilibrium and analyze its basic welfare properties. The most important feature of the course is its close connection with realistic issues. Students are required to read relevant applied theory papers that mainly cover finance area. Students are strongly encouraged to participate in analyzing real world problems in class.
Key Objectives
After finishing this course, successful students should be able to read professional journal articles in game theory and general equilibrium; able to use game theory (and general equilibrium theory) to analyze simple realistic problems.
Recommended Textbook
Andreau Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.
Reference
Zhiyong Tu (2009), Game Theory, Peking University Press.
Grading
Class Participation 20%
Assignments 20%
Mid-Term Examination (Date: TBA) 30%
Final Examination (Date: TBA) 30%
Total 100%
Assignments 20%
Mid-Term Examination (Date: TBA) 30%
Final Examination (Date: TBA) 30%
Total 100%
Attendance
The attendance is required. Students have two times free missing except emergency under official permission. Violation of the attendance rule will lead to the failure of the course.
Cheating and Plagiarism
The penalties for any form of cheating or plagiarism (whether in exams or term work) are severe. Written work submitted must be your own. Plagiarized written work will not be accepted and you should be aware that non acceptance of a submission might, in some cases, lead to failure in the course.
Tentative Course Schedule
2 Note: relevant papers and reading materials will be distributed in class.
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Course Content
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| 1 | Introduction: course outline, relevant math knowledge, theoretical framework of decision theory and its applications. |
| 2 | Static game of complete information I: Equilibrium assumptions and special strategies |
| 3 | Static game of complete information II: Nash Equilibrium and its calculations |
| 4 | Dynamic game of complete information I: Subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium and its applications |
| 5 | Dynamic game of complete information II: Repeated game and its applications |
| 6 | Mid-term exam |
| 7 | Static game of incomplete information I: Harsanyi transformation and BayesianNash Equilibrium |
| 8 | Static game of incomplete information II: Auction Theory and its applications |
| 9 | Static game of incomplete information III: Mechanism design A (basic method) |
| 10 | Static game of incomplete information IV: Mechanism design B (applications) |
| 11 | Dynamic game of incomplete information I: Bayesian updating and Weak Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium |
| 12 | Dynamic game of incomplete information II: Signaling game in the labor market and its solution |
| 13 | Equilibrium refinement and selection |
| 14 | Behavioral models I |
| 15 | Behavioral models II |
| 16 | General equilibrium (GE) vs. partial equilibrium, concepts and framework |
| 17 | 1st and 2nd fundamental theorem of welfare economics, GE applications |
| 18 | Overall course review |