高级微观经济学（二）
Syllabus of Advanced Microeconomics II
Spring Semester, 2009
Module 1: Feb 16, 2009 – April 19, 2009
Lecturer: Zhiyong Tu
Course Introduction
This course is a continuation of Advanced Microeconomics I. It will cover the game theory as a whole and part of general equilibrium theory. In the game theory section, we will introduce solution concepts for various games and their classical applications. In the general equilibrium section, we will present the theoretical framework for general equilibrium and analyze its basic welfare properties.
Key Objectives
After finishing this course, successful students should be able to read professional journal articles in game theory and general equilibrium; able to use game theory (and general equilibrium theory) to analyze simple realistic problems.
Recommended Textbook
Andreau Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory,
References
Zhiyong Tu (2009), Game Theory, Peking University Press, forthcoming.
Grading Class Participation 10%
Assignments 20%
Mid-Term Examination (Date: TBA) 30%
Final Examination (Date: TBA) 40%
Total 100%
Cheating and Plagiarism
The penalties for any form of cheating or plagiarism (whether in exams or term work) are severe. Written work submitted must be your own. Plagiarized written work will not be accepted and you should be aware that non acceptance of a submission might, in some cases, lead to failure in the course.
Tentative Course Schedule
Course Content | |
1 | Introduction: course outline, relevant math knowledge |
2 | Theoretical framework of decision theory and its applications |
3 | Elements of a game |
4 | Static game of complete information I: equilibrium assumptions and special strategies |
5 | Static game of complete information II: Nash equilibrium and its calculations |
6 | Dynamic game of complete information I: Subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium and its applications |
7 | Dynamic game of complete information II: repeated game under complete information |
8 | Mid-term exam |
9 | Static game of incomplete information I: Harsanyi transformation and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium |
10 | Static game of incomplete information II: Auction Theory and its applications |
11 | Static game of incomplete information III: Mechanism design A (basic method) |
12 | Static game of incomplete information IV: Mechanism design B (applications) |
13 | Dynamic game of incomplete information I: Bayesian updating and weak perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium |
14 | Dynamic game of incomplete information II: Signaling game in the labor market and its solution |
15 | Equilibrium refinement and selection |
16 | General equilibrium vs partial equilibrium |
17 | 1st and 2nd fundamental theorem of welfare economics |
18 | Overall course review |