

FIN 536 Corporate Governance Module IV, 2017-2018

Course Information

Instructor: Di Li

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Classes:

Lectures: Monday & Thursday, 8:30-10:20 Venue: PHBS Building, Room 231

Course Website:

Go to PHBS Course Management System (CMS): cms.phbs.pku.edu.cn. After you log in, search and enrol into the course "Corporate Governance (2017-18M4)" using the code "CG17M4". **All students must register** into CMS because the course assignments will be distributed and submitted through the course website.

1. Course Description

1.1 Context

Course overview:

This course reviews fundamental theories and practices of corporate governance. Topics include: the history of the corporation, board of directors, the division of profit sharing and various forms of employee ownership and equity ownership among insiders, regulation, shareholder activism, the impact of takeovers on corporate governance, ethical issues such as conflicts of interest and insider trading, international corporate governance, and policy developments likely to impact the corporation, etc. The class will be organized as a mix of lectures, case studies, and topic discussions.

Prerequisites:

This course presumes that students have taken basic courses in accounting, economics, finance, and econometrics. Students are recommended to have completed the following course: "Corporate Finance."

1.2 Textbooks and Reading Materials

Lecture notes, assignments, academic articles, and other useful materials will be posted on the course web page.

Reference Texts:

Corporate Governance, by Robert Monks and Nell Minow. John Wiley & Sons, 5th ed. (MM). *A Real Look at Real World Corporate Governance*, by David Larcker and Brian Tayan (LT).

Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational Choices and Their Consequences, by David Larcker and Brian Tayan, 2nd ed.

Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies, and Practices, by Bob Tricker. Oxford University Press, 3^{rd} ed.

2. Learning Outcomes

2.1 Intended Learning Outcomes

Learning Goals	Objectives	Assessment (YES with details or NO)
1. Our graduates will be effective communicators.	 1.1. Our students will produce quality business and research-oriented documents. 	\checkmark
	1.2. Students are able to professionally present their ideas and also logically explain and defend their argument.	\checkmark
2. Our graduates will be skilled in team work and leadership.	 Students will be able to lead and participate in group for projects, discussion, and presentation. 	
	2.2. Students will be able to apply leadership theories and related skills.	
3. Our graduates will be trained in ethics.	3.1. In a case setting, students will use appropriate techniques to analyze business problems and identify the ethical aspects, provide a solution and defend it.	\checkmark
	3.2. Our students will practice ethics in the duration of the program.	\checkmark
4. Our graduates will have a global perspective.	4.1. Students will have an international exposure.	\checkmark
5. Our graduates will be skilled in problem- solving and critical thinking.	 5.1. Our students will have a good understanding of fundamental theories in their fields. 	
	5.2. Our students will be prepared to face problems in various business settings and find solutions.	N
	5.3. Our students will demonstrate competency in critical thinking.	

2.3 Assessment/Grading Details

The course grade will be determined by the following scheme:

Mid-term exam	45%
Project 1	15%
Project 2 and presentation	30%
Class participation	10%
Total	100%

2.4 Academic Honesty and Plagiarism

It is important for a student's effort and credit to be recognized through class assessment. Credits earned for a student work due to efforts done by others are clearly unfair. Deliberate

dishonesty is considered academic misconducts, which include plagiarism; cheating on assignments or examinations; engaging in unauthorized collaboration on academic work; taking, acquiring, or using test materials without faculty permission; submitting false or incomplete records of academic achievement; acting alone or in cooperation with another to falsify records or to obtain dishonestly grades, honors, awards, or professional endorsement; or altering, forging, or misusing a University academic record; or fabricating or falsifying of data, research procedures, or data analysis.

All assessments are subject to academic misconduct check. Misconduct check may include reproducing the assessment, providing a copy to another member of faculty, and/or communicate a copy of this assignment to the PHBS Discipline Committee. A suspected plagiarized document/assignment submitted to a plagiarism checking service may be kept in its database for future reference purpose.

Where violation is suspected, penalties will be implemented. The penalties for academic misconduct may include: deduction of honour points, a mark of zero on the assessment, a fail grade for the whole course, and reference of the matter to the Peking University Registrar.

For more information of plagiarism, please refer to PHBS Student Handbook.

3. Topics, Teaching and Assessment Schedule

The following course outline is an approximate schedule of topics to be covered. Please note that it is subject to change.

Date	Topics
May 3, Thursday	Introduction of the course
	Introduction of corporate governance I
	The role and purpose of corporate governance
	Theoretical aspects of corporate governance
	Agency theory and separation of ownership and control
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 1
May 7, Monday	Introduction of corporate governance II
	Corporate governance mechanisms
	International corporate governance
	Seven myths of corporate governance
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 1
	Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010), "The State of Corporate Governance Research," <i>Review of Financial Studies</i> , 23(3), 939-961.
	Shleifer and Vishny (1997), "A Survey of Corporate Governance," <i>Journal of Finance</i> , 52(2), 737-783.
	Larcker and Tayan, "Seven Myths of Corporate Governance," Stanford University working paper.

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May 10, Thursday	Shareholders and Shareholder Activism I
	Ownership structure and firm performance
	The role of institutional investors
	Proxy fights and takeover bids
	Case Study: Chrysler Takeover Attempt
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 2
May 14, Monday	Shareholders and Shareholder Activism II
	Hedge fund activism
	Market for corporate control
	The threat of takeover
	G-index and E-index
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 2
	Brav et al. (2008), "Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance," <i>Journal of Finance</i> , 63(4), 1729-1775.
	Gantchev, Gredil, and Jotikasthira (2017), "Governance under the Gun: Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism," Southern Methodist University working paper.
	Klein and Zur (2009), "Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors," <i>Journal of Finance</i> , 64(1), 187-229.
	Brav et al. (2017), "How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation?" Journal of Financial Economics forthcoming.
	Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 118(1), 107-156.
	Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008), "What Matters in Corporate Governance?" <i>Review of Financial Studies</i> , 22(1), 783-827.
May 16,	Controlling Shareholders I
Wednesday	Controlling-minority shareholder structure
	Dual-class stock, corporate pyramids, or cross-holdings
	Family-owned firms and governance
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 2
	Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (1999), "Stock Pyramids, Cross- Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash Flow Rights," in <i>Concentrated</i> <i>Corporate Ownership</i> (2000), Randall K. Morck, editor (p. 295-318).
May 21, Monday	Controlling Shareholders II
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 2
	Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), "Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups," <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 117(1), 121-148.
	Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006), "A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups," <i>Journal of Finance</i> , 61(6), 2637-2680.
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May 24, Thursday	Controlling Shareholders III Decoupling of economic and voting ownership Empty voting Reading: MM Chapter 2 Hu and Black (2007), "Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of
	Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership," <i>Journal of Corporate Finance</i> , 13(2-3), 343- 367. Assignment due: Project 1
May 28, Monday	Board of Directors I
	Director and board structure
	Who are they? Role, fiduciary duties and responsibilities
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 3
	LT Part I
	Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010), "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," <i>Journal of Economic</i> Literature, 48(1), 58-107.
	Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of Management," <i>American Economic Review</i> , 88(1), 96-118.
	Ahern and Dittmar (2012), "The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation," <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 127(1), 137-197.
May 31, Thursday	Midterm exam
June 4, Monday	Board of Directors II
	Board structure and consequences
	Independent directors
	Sarbanes-Oxley compliance
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 3
	LT Part I
	Adams and Ferreira (2007), "A Theory of Friendly Boards," <i>Journal of Finance</i> , 62(1), 217-250.
	Masulis and Mobbs (2011), "Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market," <i>Journal of Finance</i> , 66(3), 823-872.

June 7, Thursday	Executive Incentives I
	Executive compensation
	Theory of financial contracting
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 4
	LT Part IV
	Kaplan and Rauh (2009), "Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?" <i>Review of Financial Studies</i> , 23(3), 1004-1050.
June 11, Monday	Executive Incentives II
	Managerial ownership and firm performance
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 4
	LT Part IV
	Kim and Lu (2011), "CEO Ownership, External Governance, and Risk- Taking," <i>Journal of Financial Economics</i> , 102(2), 272-292.
	Kim and Ouimet (2014), "Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership: Motives and Outcomes," <i>Journal of Finance</i> , 69(3), 1273-1319.
June 14, Thursday	Creditors
	Institutional lenders as corporate governance
	Credit rating agencies
	Auditors
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 3
	LT Part II
June 20,	International corporate governance
Wednesday	Law and corporate governance
	Cross-country difference vs. firm-level difference
	Cross-border investment by foreign investors
	Investor protection and home bias
	Reading:
	MM Chapter 5
	Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2008), "Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms?" <i>Review of Financial Studies</i> , 23(1), 3245-3285.
	Reese and Weisbach (2002), "Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings," <i>Journal of Financial Economics</i> , 66(1), 65-104.

June 21, Thursday	Corporate Citizenship Stakeholder view of the firm International aspects of corporate citizenship Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder value maximization Reading: Deng, Kang, and Low (2014), "Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value Maximization: Evidence from Mergers," <i>Journal of</i> <i>Financial Economics</i> , 110(1), 87-109.
June 25, Monday	Case Study: Baosteel Group: Governance with Chinese Characteristics
June 28, Thursday	Assignment due: Project 2 Presentation: Project 2 Report
July 2, Monday	Presentation: Project 2 Report